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Abstract 
 
The policy note aims at identifying key challenges and opportunities for future 
migration policy, including win-win solutions that would allow sending and receiving 
countries in and around Europe to benefit most from geographic mobility of people. 
The note  
 
1. highlights demographic, economic and political gaps explaining international 
migration;  
2. explores the main options for the EU member states and reviews the expereinces 
of traditional countries of immigration; 
3. investigates the implications of a pro-active recruitment approach, including the 
impacts on both sending and receiving countries; 
4. discusses development implications for sending countries; 
5. sketches the institutional requirements and necessary changes to move toward 
win-win solutions, identifying areas of potential cooperation between sending and 
receiving countries. 
 
The policy note concludes with a short summary and an outlook on open questions.   ii
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Executive Summary 
 
This paper aims at identifying key challenges and opportunities, including win-win 
solutions that would allow sending and receiving countries in and around Europe to 
benefit most from geographic mobility of people. The mission of the World Bank is 
poverty reduction with a focus on economic and social development in low and 
middle income countries, the Bank’s client countries. This development focus also 
determines the approach for this text on international migration. Formulating mutually 
benefiting strategies, however, requires also the identification of interests and 
potential advantages of migration for high income countries, the Bank’s sponsor 
countries. To this end the text seeks a balanced approach in the identification of 
challenges and opportunities for both sending and receiving countries of migration 
flows. The note provides a framework for further consideration and research but not 
firm answers to the issues raised. 
 
Today Europe is home or host to a fifth of the world’s migrant population. This 
almost equals the size of the foreign-born population in the US. Migration to Europe – 
mostly originating from the geographic vicinity – is related to major economic, 
demographic and political gaps between the EU and neighboring regions. While the 
EU is a relatively wealthy and politically stable world region with an aging and 
eventually shrinking population, neighboring countries to the south and southeast are 
much poorer and politically less stable, but have young and growing populations. In 
this situation migration from the poorer but demographically growing to the richer but 
demographically stagnating societies is almost inevitable. The first question therefore 
is how to manage – not how to prevent – migration to Europe.  
 
In any case such migration might be in the interest of sending countries 
wanting to reduce pressure on their labor markets and to avoid the underutilization of 
skills. Sending countries also have a growing interest in remittances generated by 
their migrant diaspora. For some countries such remittances have become a major 
source of capital. At the same time such migration may be in the interest of the EU 
and its member states as a means to reduce current and future shortages of labor 
and skills.  
 
Migration should be seen as a partial answer to both surplus labor supply in 
sending countries and aging and eventually shrinking domestic work forces in 
Europe. Migration can only play such a role if Europe is able to attract migrants with 
needed skill levels; and if these migrants have access to formal labor markets. To 
this end Europe will have to develop a comprehensive migration policy that 
incorporates selection and admission procedures for people who qualify for economic 
reasons as temporary migrants or as permanent immigrants. Europe might also be in 
need of unskilled migrants. And Europe may have to pay more attention to the 
development of skills and qualifications in potential sending countries: for example by 
co-financing parts of the education system. This may counterbalance possible 
negative effects for sending countries linked to brain drain. 
 
Experiences of traditional countries of immigration – in particular Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand – should be analyzed and adapted. In this context the EU 
and its member states also have to review and improve measures and rights 
facilitating the integration of long-term migrants and arrangements regulating access 
of migrants to social security benefits and services such as education and health.   2
Higher attention should also be paid to the transferability of social insurance and 
benefits of migrants who return to their countries of origin, in particular health and 
pension benefits. 
 
A permanent dialogue between the EU and sending countries could explore 
the possibility of cooperation in various migration-related fields. In principle sending 
and receiving countries have a common interest to explore win-win solutions that 
allow not only the countries and economies involved but also the migrants 
themselves to gain from geographic mobility of labor and skills. Issues for such a 
dialogue could be joint border management, agreements on visa regimes and labor 
permits, orderly departure and safe travel arrangements, living and working 
conditions of migrant workers and permanent immigrants, brain drain and skill 
formation, transferability and portability of claims towards social security, dual 
citizenship, channels and average costs of remittances. Such migration-related 
issues might also become elements of future trade, cooperation and association 
agreements between the EU and third countries.  
 
All attempts to develop and implement coherent migration regimes as well as 
integration and citizenship policies need public support among domestic populations 
and polities of sending and receiving societies. It is therefore necessary to explain 
why and how shaping – not preventing – future migration to Europe, influencing the 
composition of the migrants, and incorporating those who will – and should – stay for 
an extended period of time can be managed in the best interest of both migrants and 
Europeans themselves. 
   3
Part I Background and Options 
 




1 is home or host to 36-39 million international migrants, about 8 percent of its 
population.
2 Some 33–35 million migrants have taken up residence in one of the 15 
states that constituted the EU until recent enlargement (EU 15). The 10 new member 
states host about 1.5 million permanent or long-term residents who are foreign born.
3 
In absolute terms, Europe’s immigrant population is about the same size as the 
number of immigrants in the United States. Europe has become one of the main 
destinations on the world map of international migration. From a historical 
perspective, this is a relatively new phenomenon.  
 
After having been primarily countries of emigration for more than two 
centuries, during the last 50 years, all countries of Western Europe gradually became 
destinations for international migrants (table 3). Several of the new EU member 
states in Central Europe also follow that pattern.
4 The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia already have a positive migration balance (table 4). It is very 
likely that, sooner or later, this will be the case in other new EU member states. Many 
Europeans, however, still do not see their homelands as destinations for immigration. 
Today, this contrafactual perception of demographic realities has become an 
obstacle to the development and implementation of proactive migration regimes. 
 
International migration is certainly increasing on a global scale (see table 5), 
and the causes and underlying processes that have led to this shift from emigration 
to immigration in Europe are manifold. The most important causes are related to the 
considerable economic, social, and political imbalances that characterize the gap 
between relatively rich, democratic, and stable but aging societies in Europe and the 
much poorer, less stable, but youthful and demographically growing societies in 
neighboring and other world regions. 
 
 
1.1 Demographic  Imbalances 
 
                                                 
1. Defined as the EU-25; Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway (European Economic Area 
[EEA]); and Switzerland, with 467 million inhabitants (table 4). 
2. Official statistics in many European countries do not consider population by place of birth 
but by citizenship. Naturalized immigrants are therefore not always statistically “visible,” and native-
born children with foreign citizenship remain in the “foreigner” category if at birth they acquire only 
their parents’ citizenship. In the decade 1992-2001 some 5,855,000 people were naturalized in EU 15  
(OECD/ Sopemi 2004). Bringing them into the picture is crucial in order to fully understand the 
quantitative impact of migration and to analyze the social and economic status of Europe’s immigrant 
population. Table 1 in the annex details the stock of legal foreign residents and statistically identified 
immigrants (i.e. foreign-born residents) in EU 15 according to various data sources; table 2 shows 
foreign labor in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total labor force in selected European 
countries. For a detailed analysis of migrants and legal foreign residents in EU 15 see Münz and 
Fassmann (2004). 
3. About 1.7 million migrants live in Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.  
4. The new EU member states in Central Europe and the Mediterranean have a total 
population of 74 million.   4
Europe’s demographic situation is characterized by low fertility, an increasing life 
expectancy, and overall by a projected shrinking of populations in the decades to 
come. This contrasts with the neighboring south and southeastern regions, where 
fertility is much higher, albeit declining, life expectancy is also increasing, and overall 
population is projected to continue to grow at a high pace. Low fertility and increasing 
life expectancy in Europe both reverse the age pyramid, leading to a shrinking 
number of younger people, an aging work force, and an increasing number and 
share of older people.
5 According to Eurostat data and projections by the United 
Nations, Western and Central Europe’s
6 total population size will remain stable 
during the next 20 years (2000: 464 million, 2003: 467 million, 2025: 466 million) and 
start to decrease only during the following decades (by 2050, 442 million). But in the 
absence of massive recruitment of economically active migrants, the number of 
people between ages 15 and 64 will decrease from 312 million (2000) to 295 million 
(or –5.5 percent) until 2025 and to 251 million (–19.6 percent) by 2050.  
 
During the same period, the number of people older than 65 in Western and 
Central Europe will increase from 73 million (2000) to 104 million by 2025 (+42.5 
percent) and then at a slower pace to 125 million in 2050 (+71.0 percent). As a result 
the old age dependency ratio (population 65+/population 15-65) is likely to increase 
from 23 percent (2000) to 35 percent (2025) and 45-50 percent (2050). 
 
The situation in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, and Central Asia 
(EECA-20)
7 is similar to the one in the EU-25. In the EECA-20, the population will 
also remain stable during the next 25 years (in 2000, 405 million; by 2025, 407 
million) and then start to decrease during the following decades (by 2050, 381 
million; –6.2 percent). Continuing population growth is expected for Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, and most parts of Central Asia, but most Balkan countries, Russia, and 
Ukraine face considerable demographic decline.
8 In the EECA-20, the number of 
people between ages 15 and 64 will slightly increase from 270 million (in 2000) to 
277 million in 2025 (+2.6 percent) and then rapidly decrease to 235 million (–13 
percent) in 2050. 
 
In contrast, the situation in Europe’s southern and southeastern neighbors (the 
Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf states [MENA-20])
9 is characterized by 
higher—but declining—fertility, rising life expectancy, and sustained demographic 
growth. Total population in the MENA-20 will grow steadily from 316 million in 2000 
to 492 million by 2025 (+55.7 percent) and to 638 million by 2050 (+102.0 percent). 
During this period, the number of people between ages 15 and 64 will more than 
double, from 187 million in 2000 to 323 million by 2025 (+72.7 percent) and continue 
to grow at almost the same rate to 417 million  by 2050 (+123.0 percent). 
                                                 
5. For an illustration of projected population changes across regions and age groups, see 
figures 1 and 2. 
6. The 28 EU+EEA countries and Switzerland. 
7. The EECA-20 countries consist of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, 
Russian Fed., Serbia-Montenegro (including Kosovo), Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan; see table 7. 
8. Some EECA-20 countries—for example, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Romania—already have a 
declining population. 
9. The MENA-20 countries consist of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories (West Bank and Gaza), 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; see table 7.   5
 
At the same time, this region also faces an aging problem. Its population over 
age 65 will grow from 13 million in 2000) to 31 million in 2025 (+148.0 percent) and to 




1.2 Labor  Force 
 
The change in the economically active population, however, will be smaller than the 
projected changes for the 15–64 age group, because only 60–80 percent of this age 
group are currently employed or self-employed (table 6). After 2010, Western and 
Central Europe (the EU-25) can expect a decrease in the active population. Until 
2025, the decrease will be –16 million (figure 3). During the same period (2000–25), 
the active or job-seeking population will still increase by 7 million people in the 
EECA-20 and by 93 million in  the MENA-20.
11 In the EECA-20, this increase will 
mainly take place in Turkey and Central Asia; in countries such as Bulgaria, Serbia 
and Montenegro,
12 Moldavia, and Romania the active or job-seeking population is 
already shrinking. 
 
Throughout the 21st century, Europe will be confronted with a rapidly shrinking 
(native) work force (–46 million until 2050; figure 4) while the potentially active 
population will continue to grow in Europe’s southern and southeastern neighbors 
(+157 million until 2050 for the MENA-20) and in Turkey and parts of Central Asia 
(EECA-20 overall: –28 million until 2050; Turkey: +17 million; rest of EECA: -45 
million).  
 
For Europe the main challange is the changing ratio between economically 
active and retired persons. With a projected employment rate of 70%, the number of 
employed persons per persons aged 65 and over will decline from 2.7 in 2010, to 
some 2.2 in 2020, to 1.8 in 2030 and to only 1.5 in 2040. If, after reaching the so-
called Lisbon target, the employment rate were to rise further to 75% between 2010 
and 2020, the decline in this ratio would be attenuated, reaching 2.4 in 2020 
 
In North Africa and the Middle East the main challenge is to absorb those 
currently unemployed and those entering the labor market during the next two 
decades. In order to fully cope with this challenge the MENA-20 countries would 
have to create 45 million new jobs until 2010 and more than 100 million until 2025 
while Europe is confronted with choices concerning higher pensionable age, higher 
labor force participation of women, and the recruitment of immigrants. The current 
labor market conditions in many MENA-20 countries raise doubts whether these 
economies will be able to absorb the significant expansion of the labor force. As a 
consequence of persistent, large-scale unemployment in many MENA-20 countries, 
migration pressures on the contracting labor markets in Europe will increase. 
 
 
                                                 
10. Data from the United Nations Common Database. 
11. Data from authors’ own calculations, based on projections from the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Economically Active Population database and United Nations Population Division 
(2003).  
12. Without Kosovo.   6
1.3 Economic  Imbalances 
 
Economic indicators clearly show two things: the large gap between Europe and 
neighboring world regions, but also considerable heterogeneity within these regions. 
The maximum ratio of per capita income between the richest European and poorest 




In 2000, Western and Central Europe (the EU-25, the EEA, and Switzerland) 
had 465 million inhabitants, with an average per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) US$ 19,000, ranging in Western Europe from US$ 42,000 (Luxembourg) to 
US$ 11,000 (Portugal) and in the new EU member states from US$ 9,400 (Slovenia) 
to US$ 3,200 (Latvia). The EECA-20 region had 402 million inhabitants, with an 
average per capita GDP of US$ 1,600, ranging from US$ 4,600 (Croatia) and US$ 
2,100–2,200 (Russian Federation, Turkey) to a mere US$ 170 (Tajikistan). The 
Middle East and North Africa in 2000 were home to 313 million people, with an 
average per capita GDP of US$ 2,600 per year. In the Gulf states, the average per 
capita GDP is close to European levels (US$ 11,000), but the region also comprises 
low-income countries such as Morocco (US$ 1,200), Syria (US$ 1,100), and Yemen 




1.4  Political Stability and Rule of Law 
 
Political, ethnic, or religious conflicts exist in all world regions compared in this note. 
But as asylum and displacement figures show, only some of these conflicts create 
migration pressure, which explains, at least in part, the annual inflow of some 
400,000–450,000 people
15 seeking asylum in Europe.
16 A ranking of all EU+EEA, 
EECA, and MENA countries according to a political stability indicator and a rule of 
law indicator may serve as a proxy for the level of individually perceived insecurity.
17 
Despite all the possible imperfections in the constructions of such indicators, the 
exercise indicates differences in political stability, the human rights situation, and the 
general rule of law between Europe and neighboring regions, with the EU countries 
at the top of the score, most Eastern European and Balkan countries in the medium 
range, and many of the MENA countries in the lower segments. 
 
In Europe, all 25 EU member states are characterized by a high degree of 
political stability and a general rule of law. In contrast, the populations of several 
countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, as well as in North Africa 
and the Middle East, are confronted with some degree of political instability (or the 
prospects of such instability occurring) and no universal rule of law. This may 
significantly reduce individual security and hence impact the decision to remain in the 
country of origin or to emigrate. Besides the economic and demographic arguments, 
                                                 
13. At current exchange rates. 
14. Data from the United Nations Common Database. 
16. For the last 14 years, the lowest figure was 260,100 (in 1996), the highest was 698,600 (in 
1992; see table 11). 
15. In 2000–03, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Russian Federation (in particular, Chechnya), Serbia 
and Montenegro/Kosovo, and Turkey were the most important countries of origin of people seeking 
asylum in Europe. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2004) 
17. The expected value of the indicator across all countries worldwide is 0, with a standard 
deviation of 1. For further information on how the indicator is constructed, see Kaufmann (et al. 2003).    7
the political and human rights imbalance adds yet another dimension to such 
decisions and therefore has to be taken into account when considering the realities of 





These imbalances explain why Europe is and will continue to be a major destination 
for migrants, even in times of slow economic growth, high domestic unemployment in 
many EU countries, and growing efforts to control and eventually reduce the inflow of 
asylum seekers and regular and irregular labor migrants. In 2001 alone, some 1.47 
million new immigrants lawfully took residence or claimed asylum in one of the 15 EU 
member states.
18 On average, the annual net gain from migration of the EU-15 is just 
over 1 million people per year (about 2.2 per 1,000), which explains four-fifths of 
Europe’s population growth (tables 3, 4). 
 
Even if economic conditions in the sending countries were to improve, one 
should not expect the economic push factors to disappear quickly. The current levels 
of economic growth and job creation in sending countries in the wider Europe (in 
particular, MENA and Central Asia) and other parts of the world with migratory links 
to Europe (for example, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia) are not sufficient to absorb 
the projected demographic growth and, in particular, growth of the labor force in 
these countries. Large cohorts will try to enter the labor market during the coming 
years, while unemployment and underemployment are already high.  
 
One also has to bear in mind that the majority of migrants either do not come 
from the lowest-income countries, but rather from the middle-income countries, or 
they come from low-income countries but have a middle-class background. It seems 
that emigration only occurs once a certain level of development has been reached, 
which allows a first generation of potential emigrants to acquire the necessary means 
for leaving their home country. Therefore, a successful development process could in 
the short run lead to an increase in migration rather than a decrease—the so-called 




2  Migration: An Important Issue for the EU, Its Member States, 
and Neighboring Countries 
 
Various reasons cause the countries in Europe’s vicinity to be the main sending 
countries and EU member states to be the main receiving countries. Key issues are 
sketched in this section and elaborated later in this note. 
 
 
2.1  Trade, Capital Flows, and Migration 
 
                                                 
16. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004). 
19. For an overview of current research and activities of relevant stakeholders on issues, 
causes and effects of international migration and international cooperation on migration issues, see 
Tamas (2003).   8
Intensified trade relations, as in EU partnerships with neighboring and developing 
countries, have been put forward as a substitute for interregional migration and 
indeed as a means of containing mass migration from poorer to richer countries. In 
fact, international economics textbooks describe trade, capital flows, and the mobility 
of labor as (perfect) substitutes to achieve factor price equalization. Furthermore, 
increased trade is expected to lead to higher growth—in particular in poorer 
countries—and the ensuing economic convergence should reduce the incentives for 
migration. Yet research on trade and migration suggests that trade liberalization and 
migration control are not substitute policies, at least not in the short term. On the 
contrary, there are strong indications that both are complements, particularly if trade 
liberalization happens between richer and significantly poorer countries.
20 At least 
initially, migration pressure may surge or not be reduced substantially, as has been 
shown by the aftermath of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
21  
Furthermore, there are convincing claims that overall welfare gains from liberalization 




2.2  Brain Drain, Brain Gain, or Brain Waste? 
 
Data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
suggests that 20–30 percent of all physicians in the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom earned their degrees abroad—in the majority of cases, in developing 
countries. These countries are estimated to supply more than 50 percent of all 
migrating physicians but receive only a little more than 10 percent through return 
migration of former medical students educated in Europe and North America.
22 
Analysis carried out by the World Bank also shows that by 2000, some 60 percent of 
East Asian adults living in the United States had attended college or graduate school 
in their home country.
23 This could be seen as a substantial subsidy by sending 
countries’ publicly funded education systems for more developed receiving countries. 
 
However, it has been argued that the anticipation of such opportunities could 
increase the number of people interested in higher education. Because many of them 
ultimately do not emigrate, human capital formation could be stimulated.
24 
 
It is as yet undecided whether and under what conditions international 
migration causes brain drain that is detrimental to the economic and social 
development of particular sending countries or under what conditions it leads to 
circulation of skills, their improvement, and eventual later return while high 
unemployment at home would lead to a considerable underuse of these skills and 
therefore eventually to “brain waste.” Whatever the actual results are, certain sending 
countries and nongovernmental organizations have accused receiving countries of 
“skimming off” skills while severely damaging certain sectors of sending countries—in 
particular, the health care sector.  
 
                                                 
20. Faini (et al. 1999). 
21. See Papademetriou (2004). 
22. See OECD (2002). 
23. See Lucas (2001). 
24. See Stark (et al. 1998).   9
For a certain number of countries, it could be argued that the emigration of 
skilled people ultimately leads to higher remittances that more than compensate for 
the net loss. Recent estimates for India suggest that in 2001, fiscal loss due to 
emigration amounted to a maximum of 0.6 percent of Indian GDP, and the total value 






Remittances are a core topic related to international migration, and the World Bank 
as well as the Hamburg Institute of International Economics are actively engaging in 
research to document both the magnitude and the direction of flows and to determine 
the impact of remittances on development. An assessment of documented flows 
shows their substantial increase during the 1990s (table 8 and figure 10) and 
indicates that their total volume has become substantially larger than the combined 
total of public and private official development assistance (ODA). 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that remittances have a positive impact on 
poverty reduction.
26 Some of the EU’s main foreign labor sources (countries such as 
Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, and Albania), as well as India, are major receiving 
countries of remittances (table 9). Among the EU countries, France and Germany are 
the main sources of official remittances, which are mainly channeled by money 
transfer providers. It has to be stressed, though, that official numbers can be 
assumed to be substantially underreported, because there are no data available on 
the extent of unofficial remittances. As a result of the high costs of official money 
transfers, migrant communities quickly develop parallel and alternative ways of 
transferring money back home, usually based on informal personal and ethnic 
networks. It is often conjectured that such networks can eventually be abused for 
money laundering and other illegal activities, including financing terrorism. 
 
 
2.4  Demographic Aging and Skills Shortages 
 
In all countries of Western Europe, as well as in all new EU member states, fertility is 
below replacement level while life expectancy continues to grow. Both trends 
contribute to the aging of European societies. Low fertility sooner or later leads to 
lower numbers of native-born children in the educational system, lower numbers of 
native-born young adults entering the labor markets with newly acquired skills, an 
aging domestic work force, and ultimately shrinking native populations. In this 
context, the recruitment of qualified migrants can be seen as a possible answer to 
shortages of skills and labor. But Europe would have to compete with traditional and, 
perhaps, new receiving countries (such as Japan and the Gulf states) for qualified 
and motivated potential migrants. Europe would therefore have to adapt its migration 
regime to such competition. 
 
 
2.5  The Importance of Current Foreign Labor for Europe 
 
                                                 
25. See Desai (et al. 2001). 
26. See Adams (2003).   10
Certain industries and sectors of Europe’s economy already rely heavily on foreign 
labor—for example, health care, agriculture, the tourism industry, and, to a certain 
extent, construction. Seasonal workers play an important role in many of these 
sectors (table 10). In many parts of Europe, regular and irregular employment of 
migrants in households (to do housework, childcare, gardening, small-scale 
construction and repair) is now a common phenomenon. Such recruitment is not 
directly related to demographic trends or shortages of skills but rather reflects 
unstable, unattractive, or low-paid segments of formal and informal labor markets 
where either vacancies cannot be filled “from within” or domestic labor is substituted 
by regular and irregular migrant workers.  
 
 
2.6  Political Emphasis on Immigration Restriction  
 
In most countries of Europe today, public concern has brought about a political 
emphasis on immigration restriction, if not prevention, on the assumption that the 
social and fiscal costs (and therefore also political costs) of immigration may 
outweigh its benefits. Recent terrorist activities in Europe and the United States have 
intensified security concerns. The opposite is true for most sending countries. There, 
emigration is seen as an opportunity for the mobile segment of society, a relief for 
domestic labor markets, and a major source of national as well as individual income 
through remittances from successful migrants. This creates considerable 
disincentives for sending countries to effectively police their borders, insist on orderly 
departure and transit, and repatriate their citizens from abroad. At the same time, EU 
member states allocate more resources for the control of their external EU/Schengen 
borders, processing of asylum seekers, and repatriation of third-country nationals 
without entitlement to residency. 
 
These efforts of EU member states to control (and through this control, to 
reduce) access to their territory have led to higher “costs of entry” for irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers. As a result, smuggling and human trafficking have 
increased dramatically during the last decade, and irregular entry to the Schengen 
area has become more common at such places as the Canary Islands, the Straits of 
Gibraltar, Sicily, the Straits of Otranto, Western Thrace, and so on. This also implies 
that several hundred irregular migrants die each year as a result of unsafe attempts 
to enter or cross EU countries.  
 
 
2.7   Migration Influencing External Relations 
 
The European Commission recognizes the potential benefits of immigration, but 
nevertheless is concerned about the consequences of a continued or even 
accelerated flow of migrants to the EU member states, including the consequences 
for the developing world. The European Commission therefore sees the necessity to 
shape its external relations to focus on the root causes of international migration 
(with the aim of reducing migration pressure) while considerably increasing the 
migration management capabilities of the EU and its neighboring countries.
27 As a 
consequence, the EU tries to make migration and readmission an issue in newly 
negotiated trade and cooperation agreements. The first such agreements including 
                                                 
27. See European Commission (2002).   11
particular migration clauses have been concluded with Hong Kong (China), Macao, 
Sri Lanka, and Albania. 
 
 
2.8 EU  Enlargement 
 
In the short run, the EU enlargement of May 2004 will probably lead to a certain 
increase in regular migration from new to old EU/EEA countries. This is mainly due to 
certain changes and restrictions: Citizens of new EU member states (with the 
exception of Cyprus and Malta) have no immediate and general access to Western 
Europe’s labor markets, but they have the right to immigrate for educational 
purposes, family reunion or establishing a business. Some old EU member states, 
however, are less restrictive than others.
28 Concurrent with EU enlargement, some 
750,000 citizens of new EU member states lawfully residing in an old member state 
have acquired the right to bring in dependent family members (spouses, minor 
children) without major restrictions. In the immediate future, regular labor migration 
from new to old EU member states will not play an important role, because many old 
EU member states have imposed a transitory regime restricting potential migrants’ 
access to their labor markets for the next two to seven years.  
 
The transitory regime granting EU citizens from East Central Europe the right 
to reside in Western Europe while restricting their access to national labor markets 
could be interpreted as an invitation to engage temporely in irregular economic 
activities. Furthermore restrictions during this transitional period will eventually lead 
to an increased migration of mobile and ambitious people from Central Europe to 
traditional immigration countries overseas, which could be seen as a potential loss 
for Europe. 
 
Data from a recent Eurobarometer survey
29 and a series of other studies
30 
show that only 1 percent of the population of the new EU member states in Central 
Europe express firm intentions to migrate to another country. Furthermore, 
experience from the Mediterranean states in the 1980s suggests that emigration is 
more likely to decrease than increase after EU accession of countries with below-
average GDP and a negative migration balance, as the examples of Greece, Ireland, 
Southern Italy, Portugal, and Spain show.
31 Finally, mobility studies within the EU 
reveal that although 8 percent of the EU population indicated intentions to migrate 
within the next 5 years, only 4 percent have actually done so within the past 10 
years, implying that intentions of spatial mobility are actually more widespread than 
the actual number of mobile people.
32 
 
In the medium and long run, however, the new EU member states of the 
accession rounds 2004 and 2007 do not have the demographic potential for large-
scale emigration to Western Europe, because most of them have more rapidly aging 
and eventually shrinking populations. Economic growth after EU accession and the 
                                                 
28. From 2004 to 2006, citizens of new EU member states have access to the labor markets 
of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands (contingent), Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
29. See Krieger (2004). 
30. See Alvarez-Plata (et al. 2004), Fassmann and Münz (2002). 
31. For example, annual emigration from Spain into other EU countries fell form 200,000 in 
1970 and 120,000 by the end of 1970s to substantially lower levels in the early 1990s. 
32. See Krieger (2004).    12
effects of EU regional funds will not only reduce emigration pressure but will sooner 
or later turn Central Europe into an area of immigration. A number of countries in this 
region already have a positive migration balance. 
 
 
3 Main  Options 
 
In light of the trends and points mentioned, it is worth considering how to manage 
economically motivated migration, as well as that induced by catastrophes or 
persecution, and assess some of the social and economic consequences for both 
receiving and sending countries and for the migrants themselves. Europe has several 
options that can be highlighted briefly. 
 
 
3.1   Continuation of the Status Quo 
 
Today, most of the long-term inflow to the EU-25 is linked to three “gates of entry:” 
family unification, asylum, and co-ethnic return migration. These three components 
explain up to 85 percent of recent long-term inflows into Northern and Northwestern 
Europe, while Southern Europe still attracts a larger share of regular and, in 
particular, irregular labor migrants. But in most of the old 15 EU member states, 
admission for humanitarian reasons is more important than admission for economic 
reasons.
33 Economic recruitment continues to play a dominant role in temporary and 
short-term migration (for example, trainees, temporary labor migrants and seasonal 
workers). 
 
This structure of inflows is similar to the situation in the United States where 
family migration also prevails over economically motivated admission, with one 
important difference: Unlike in the United States, which gives all legal immigrants 
immediate access to its labor market, many of the long-term immigrants settling in 
Europe have either no legal access to the labor market or do not manage to enter the 
labor market, which leads to below-average labor force participation and higher 
unemployment of foreign immigrants on the one hand
34 and, on the other hand, to 
above-average involvement of immigrants in activities related to irregular labor and 
service markets. The latter clearly indicates that there is and continues to be a gap—
apparently a widening gap—between reality and the immigration and residency laws, 
and it hints at a suboptimal selection of immigrants. At the same time, an apparently 
growing number of migrants enter Europe as tourists or illegally and become part of 
the irregular work force. Their actual size is unknown. But recent amnesties and 
regularization programs (1995-2003) have allowed some 2.5 million irregular 
migrants to adjust their status.
35  
 
                                                 
33. For the composition of recent immigration to Europe see European Commission/ 
Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs (2003) and OECD (2004). For an economic 
analysis of the root causes of asylum seeking in Europe and the effectiveness of stricter policies 
during the 1990s, see Hatton (2004). 
34. See Münz and Fassmann (2004); European Commission/Directorate General Employment 
and Social Affairs (2003). 
  35. See Apap (et al. 2000), Papademetriou (et al. 2004).    13
Europe continues to experience the outflow of considerable numbers of highly 
qualified younger citizens to the United States and other traditional countries of 
immigration (TCIs), which can be seen as a substantial brain gain for these countries. 
 
 
3.2 Tighter  Controls 
 
One way of reducing the disparities among existing immigration, residency and 
asylum laws, and the reality created by migration could be an attempt to further 
enforce controls both at the external EU/Schengen borders and internally, particularly 
at work sites. This would probably lead to reduced legal inflows, but there may be a 
shift from regular to irregular migration. Such a conclusion could be drawn, with some 
caution, from the example of the United States during the 1990s and early 21st 
century.
36 Never before had the United States put so much effort in policing its 
borders (particularly its southern border with Mexico),
37 and never before had there 
been a higher number of irregular migrants in the United States. In 2000-1, according 
to estimates based on US census results, the US was home or host to some 6.9 
million to 8.5 million irregular migrants.
38 This raises the question of to what extent 
tightening border controls has a real effect on the quantity and composition of 
immigration flows, and to what extent it can be considered a symbolic measure trying 
to address public concern and win support from domestic audiences. 
 
From the viewpoint of a potential migrant, tighter border control measures 
implemented by otherwise attractive and liberal industrial democracies raise the 
costs of entry. They force potential migrants to switch to alternative (usually more 
costly and dangerous) entry routes provided by the growing human smuggling 
business. Once irregular migrants reach the target countries, they are less likely to 
return to their home country because of the high reentry costs. Growing fees for 
smugglers increase the potential for exploitation of migrant workers. Highly skilled 
labor, facing such limitations, may decide to migrate to other foreign destinations, 
leading to adverse selection for countries implementing tighter controls. 
 
 
3.3 Proactive  Recruitment 
 
The economic, demographic, and political imbalances described above make it less 
likely that immigration to Europe will be significantly reduced. The reverse might be 
true. Increasing globalization and interdependence could further enhance 
international labor mobility. In this situation, the EU and the economies and societies 
of its member states could try to gain more from migration by opening new 
possibilities for a systematic and proactive recruitment of skilled migrants and 
opening their economies to lawfully admitted migrants. In this respect, strategies of 
                                                 
36. See “INS: Is Gatekeeper Working?”  (2000).  
37. See Cornelius (2001). 
38. Although the number of irregular migrants identified via U.S. Census results (6.9–8.5 
million; see Grodziak and Martin 2004, Passel 2002) is a stock figure, it is estimated that up to 5 
million of these people came during the 1990s. A large number of those who arrived earlier got a 
chance to legalize their status on the basis of the 1986 U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) leading to the regularization of 2.8 million irregular foreign residents. In Europe recent 
amnesties and regularization efforts granted some 2.5 million irregular migrnats (1995-2003) some 
form of residence permit. For regularization in Europe and the US see Papademetriou (et al. 2004) 
and Apap (et al. 2000).   14
TCIs—namely, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—can serve 
as a benchmark.  
 
 
4  The Experiences of TCIs 
 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States are the most important 
TCIs.
39 In 2001–02, they had a combined total foreign-born population of some 46.4 
million people. The United States had by far the largest foreign-born population (35.0 
million), followed by Canada (5.8 million), Australia (4.7 million), and New Zealand 
(0.9 million). But the share of the foreign-born was highest in Australia (24.3 percent), 
followed by New Zealand (22.2 percent) and Canada (18.6 percent). In the United 
States, this share is only 12.4 percent (table 12), a size comparable to the foreign-
born population of some European countries.
40  
 
In 2001, these four TCIs admitted some 1.45 million permanent legal 
immigrants altogether (table 12). In relative terms, the admission was highest in New 
Zealand (12.7 per 1,000), followed by Canada (7.3 per 1,000) and Australia (5.3 per 
1,000). The United States had the lowest admission rate (3.7 per 1,000). 
 
In contrast to many parts of Europe, these four countries see immigration as a 
permanent process. Therefore, each country has created an immigration system that 
admits temporary migrants and permanent immigrants in a deliberate fashion that 
takes into account managed migration, balancing economic considerations, family 
reunion, and international humanitarian obligations. All four countries admit the 
majority of their immigrants through procedures and criteria that are clearly defined in 
advance, relatively transparent, and from time to time up for review. In Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand, the proactive migration regimes are designed to screen 
and admit a certain proportion of new immigrants (see table 13) to augment their 
labor force with skills valued by the receiving country. But immigrants admitted for 
other reasons—to rejoin family or as refugees—are usually also expected to become 
economically active.  
 
All four countries distinguish between temporary residence permits and 
permanent immigrant status. Temporary visas are granted to foreign students and 
certain categories of labor migrants. Permanent status is granted to the core group of 
labor migrants, rejoining family members, and people admitted for humanitarian 
reasons (refugees, recognized asylum seekers).
41 Recruitment of economic migrants 
is organized through employment-based admissions,
42 labor market testing, selection 
via a points system,
43 or change of status from temporary to permanent residence. 
 
                                                 
39. Several other TCIs (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and South Africa) are no longer 
attracting large numbers of immigrants. 
40. For example, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, and Switzerland. 
41. In certain cases in the past, the United States granted only so-called temporary protection 
status—for example, to people fleeing the civil wars in El Salvador and Haiti. However, most of these 
immigrants later managed to obtain permanent status. 
42. Canada does not admit permanent immigrants sponsored by particular employers but, like 
Australia and New Zealand, awards additional points if somebody applying within the framework of the 
points system has a job offer from a Canadian employer. 
43. The United States does not have a points system for admission.   15
Admission of permanent migrants based on economic considerations plays a 
very prominent role in Canada (63 percent of all permanent immigrants) and New 
Zealand (54 percent), but is somewhat less important in Australia (37 percent) and 
the United States (21 percent; table 13).
44 Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
implement selection via a points system. These systems award points to applicants 
according to their individual and sociodemographic characteristics—mainly for 
education and training, professional experience, linguistic skills,
45 and age—and to a 
lesser extent for prior studies or work experience or both in the receiving country, 
family members already residing in that country, and some other criteria. Additional 
points are awarded if the applicant has a job offer from a domestic employer (table 
14). In 2003, the passing mark for successful applications through the points system 
was 75 percent (of all points possible) in Canada, 63 percent in Australia, and 59 
percent in New Zealand (table 14). Such differences may reflect differential 
preferences of potential migrants for these three countries. The United States has no 
admission via a points system but selects some of its economic migrants (up to 
50,000 per year) through a diversity lottery. Eligible applicants for this lottery must 
demonstrate a certain level of education. 
 
 
                                                 
44. Including admission via diversity lottery. 
45. This applies only to Australia (for English) and Canada (for English and French).   16
 
Part II Becoming Proactive 
 
5 Proactive  Recruitment—a  Problem for the EU in Need of 
Reframing? 
 
Today, most regular migrants settling in Europe enter as dependent family members, 
privileged coethnic or conational migrants, or asylum seekers.
46 In the majority of 
cases, legal entry to one of the 25 EU member states is based on human rights 
(asylum, family reunion) or ethnic solidarity but to a much lesser extent on economic 
considerations. Over the next decade, however, the EU and its member states will 
have a vital interest in developing a proactive migration policy that goes beyond 
coping with existing migration pressure from neighboring regions. The main reason 
for this is Europe’s aging population and its potentially shrinking domestic work force. 
 
In the 21st century, most countries of Europe will have to recruit highly skilled 
and maybe also semi-skilled immigrants. In this field, the EU and its member states 
will have to compete with both traditional and new countries of immigration. This is a 
new phenomenon: For most of its modern history, Europe was the world region with 
the highest number of overseas emigrants, whereas mass immigration to most 
countries of Western Europe
47 set in only after World War II or, in Central Europe, is 
only about to start.
48 
 
Opening economically motivated “gates of entry” might in part reduce pressure 
in the asylum and family reunion “gates.” But it would primarily change the 
composition of migrants and may well lead to both more and better qualified 
migrants. 
 
To attract qualified potential migrants, select them according to Europe’s 
needs, and integrate them economically as well as socially, the EU and its member 
states will have to embrace cultural and institutional changes. First, future 
immigration would have to be understood as a permanent process and no longer as 
a short-term reaction to shortages on domestic labor markets or humanitarian crises 
abroad. Second, future immigration should possibly be seen as a managed process. 
This requires the introduction of efficient and transparent selection criteria and 
admission systems based on a combination of principal and discretionary decisions 
in favor of or against individual applications, certain categories of potential applicants, 
or both. Third, the implemented criteria and systems should be flexible enough to be 
adapted if empirical evidence shows contraintentional or adverse selection effects. 
Finally, proactive recruitment from third countries should be coupled with measures 
to increase mobility between EU member states. This requires not only a higher 
compatibility of social security systems but also freedom of movement for third-
                                                 
46. See OECD (2004). 
47. Exceptions are France and Switzerland, which started to recruit foreign labor and 
naturalize immigrants on a larger scale in the 19th century. 
48. Countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slowakia and Slovenia have not 
yet experienced any major inflows.    17
country nationals lawfully residing in one EU member state but so far not entitled to 




6 Impact  on  Receiving Countries  
 
The potential impact of a proactive migration policy on the EU and its member states 
is manifold but not fully predictable.
50 Under optimal conditions, the EU and its 
member states could first and foremost expect a positive impact on economic output 
in both absolute and in per capita terms. It is obvious that an increase in the 
population should have positive effects on supply capacity and demand, which will 
result in output gains. What is more important, though, is that one may also expect 
additional momentum for productivity growth—and therefore per capita income—from 
increased migration of qualified people and from a certain degree of heterogeneity. It 
is clear that this requires access to the labor market.  
 
Longitudinal data on recent permanent immigrants in Australia clearly show 
that 18 months after arrival, those admitted for their skills (employer-sponsored or 
through the points system) displayed much lower unemployment rates and earned on 
average much more than those admitted under the family reunion program or for 
humanitarian reasons (figures 11 and 12).
51 Macroeconomic forecasts project 
additional fiscal gains from taxes and social security contributions of migrants in the 
order of $A30 billion by 2014, generated to a large extent by the skilled immigrants.
52 
 
The United States may serve as another example in this respect. Productivity 
growth in the United States outpaced EU productivity growth throughout the 1990s, 
and it can be assumed that the constant inflow of young, highly motivated, and 
possibly innovative migrants from other world regions accounted for some part of the 
U.S. success story.  
 
It is in the interest of the EU and its member states to reap some of the skills 
that are available worldwide and benefit from the “brain circulation” induced by 
international migration. The intention of a proactive migration policy is to compete for 
the skilled labor potentially ready to migrate, thus ensuring that the EU economy 
catches up with other economies like the United States in terms of innovation and 
competitiveness. A dynamic economy requires not only innovation and the 
accumulation of human capital, but also competitive wages in the low-skilled labor 
segment. Such wages allow migrants—particularly unskilled migrants—to enter 
formal labor markets, and they should also make it easier to fight irregular and illegal 
labor markets. 
 
                                                 
49. These recommendations are in line with findings of the Independent High-Level Study 
Group (2003). 
For a proposal of a more coordinated pensions system in Europe, see Holzmann (2004). 
50. The impact of migrants on the receiving country and its economy is well researched in the 
United States, but much less is known about this impact in Europe because of a lack of systematic 
research. Results of such research, however, would be necessary to understand this impact, which is 
likely to be dependent on both the policy regime in the receiving country and the characteristics of 
migrants. This is also a topic which requires further—especially cross-national—research. 
51. See Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003). 
52. See Econtech (2004).   18
Different types of labor competition in the low-skilled sector can be 
distinguished. First, there are sectors in which migrants do not compete with 
domestic labor. Without migrants accepting a particular (lower) wage or without them 
having access to formal and informal labor markets, no additional economic activity 
would unfold in these sectors. As a result, employment is created that would not exist 
otherwise. Both the domestic employer and the migrants are better off, and domestic 
labor is not affected.
53 Examples of sectors in this category are services provided in 
households (care for children and the elderly, cooking, cleaning, gardening) and the 
agricultural sector (fruit picking and other methods of harvesting). 
 
Second, there are numerous sectors in which foreign labor does compete with 
domestic labor and where this competition has a potentially negative effect on wages 
paid to the domestic work force, occupational welfare, and general work conditions. 
For this reason, receiving countries have to take measures that protect both the 
domestic work force and new immigrants from unfair competition as a result of 
unequal labor costs due to informal work arrangements, the potential lack of respect 
for existing labor codes, and the lack of social security coverage for migrants. 
 
Furthermore, if migrant workers lack the skills to rapidly adapt to employer 
demands or adjust to changing labor market conditions, immigration can potentially 
increase welfare program costs. Preferably, the host country would not only admit 
migrants for a particular sector that suffers form labor shortages, but also migrants 
with a high educational level and the necessary language skills and cultural 
background. Once labor market conditions change, better-educated migrants are 
able to move to work in other sectors faster than migrants with lower or very specific 
skills. 
 
Finally, there is also evidence that an economy benefits from a certain level of 
heterogeneity within its population. A diverse population can comprise entrepreneurs 
and employees capable of bridging cultural barriers and dealing with particular 
markets abroad, in command of a large spectrum of languages, and able to add 
innovations and ideas from various cultural backgrounds. Although recent studies 
from the United States hint at possible drawbacks from diversity in terms of financing 
public goods,
54 the importance of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity for innovation and 
creativity should not be underestimated. 
 
Maintaining cultural heterogeneity created by migration means that immigrants 
would not be fully assimilated in the mainstream of society, but would maintain 
cultural differences related to language, religion, social practices, and ethnic 
background. Recent immigrants to both Europe and TCIs seemingly want to keep a 
certain level of ethnic or cultural identity that distinguishes them from the majority or 
the mainstream. Some even reject the idea that immigration requires cultural 
integration. Also, a growing proportion of the general public in Europe tends to see 
migrants as a challenge to their own culture and values. In this context, cultural 
identity and the defense of such identities tend to become more important for both 
native majorities and immigrant minorities.  
 
As a result, more attention has to be given to policies dealing with cultural 
diversity and cultural integration in receiving countries. At this time, most EU member 
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countries do not have coherent policies dealing with this dimension of international 
migration. The lively and sometimes bitter debate on the ban against Muslim girls’ 
and/or teacher’s head scarves in German and French schools highlights how 
controversial such policies can be.  
 
The task of dealing with cultural and religious heterogeneity created by 
migration (as well as with social integration) is mainly left to local governments. Many 
of them are at times not fully equipped for dealing with such issues and problems. 
Receiving countries in Europe tend to be more at ease in handling policy responses 
facilitating language training or economic integration and, to a lesser extent, policy 
responses to gender issues, religious practices, segregated education, and 
segregated community life of migrants. Policies in the latter area are often ad hoc, 
and the legal and institutional systems are often not adapted to deal with such 
problems. 
 
Better cultural integration and better handling of cultural identity and diversity 
issues related to migration could have a strong impact on changing the cost-benefit 
balance of migration for both the receiving society and the migrants. This would 
require a closer look at best practices promoting cultural integration, mutual 
tolerance, and the formulation of nonnegotiable principles. Of course, each EU 
member country has its own framework of inclusion.
55 These frameworks reflect 
historical factors—in particular, the way these countries evolved into modern nations. 
This historical path has an important impact on a country’s response to migration and 
its design of policies dealing with the cultures of migrants. Beyond any attempt at 
incorporation, the importance of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity for innovation and 
creativity should not be underestimated. 
 
 
7 Impact  on  Sending Countries  
 
Sending countries also face both favorable and adverse consequences from 
migration. Most sending countries suffer from substantial unemployment or 
underemployment, thus their governments usually are in favor of out-migration as a 
means of reducing the aggregate labor force. In rural areas with excess labor supply, 
migration would lead directly to higher labor use at nonzero wages. In urban areas, 
however, such a reduction in the aggregate labor force may decrease unemployment 
or, if labor markets were closer to equilibrium, increase overall wages as labor supply 
falls while labor demand stays more or less constant. A reduced labor force would 
also improve the usage of the domestic labor stock as employers intensify their 
search for scarce labor, promising higher wages and overall increasing the base of 
the economically active population. Nevertheless, in segmented labor markets where 
skills are industry specific, the outflow of labor in a particular sector could lead to 
upward pressure on wages and therefore output prices in that sector only. This would 
leave the rest of the labor force worse off at unchanged wages but higher consumer 
prices, in particular for nontradable goods and services. 
 
On average, migrants typically are better educated, younger, and more mobile 
than the majority in their country of origin. Hence, sending countries may not only 
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lose a substantial number of their well-educated domestic work force, but also some 
of their innovative and motivated youth. Significant out-migration could lead to both a 
brain drain and a youth drain from poorer countries. However, there are potential 
benefits, particularly in the form of remittances from successful migrants and skill 
transfers through returning migrants. 
 
The World Bank has stressed the importance of remittances sent home by 
workers abroad. The numbers are indeed impressive: official worker’s remittances to 
developing countries amounted to US$80 billion in 2002 (figure 10 and table 8), a 
number that is considered substantially underestimated because remittances are 
often sent through informal channels. It can be assumed that the actual flow is well 
above US$100 billion. Remittances constitute an important and stable or even 
increasing source of income for millions of households in developing countries. 
Worldwide remittances to low-income countries exceed ODA by far.
56 
 
The World Bank is conducting substantial research in the fields of migration 
and remittances. The evidence so far suggests that migration and remittances have a 
significant positive effect on poverty reduction. An analysis of 74 low- and middle-
income countries shows that the share of the emigrant population and the ratio of 
remittances over GDP both have a statistically significant poverty-reducing effect, 
that is, a lowering effect on the share of people living on less than US$ 1 per day.
57 
 
In addition to remittances, migrants can also have a positive impact on 
developing countries by starting up small-scale businesses or engaging in other 
types of investments upon their return to their home country, which could result in a 
transfer of skills they acquired while living and working abroad. The issue of skill 
transfers has not yet been explored intensively. 
 
Nevertheless, skill transfers also fall under the broader concept of brain 
circulation, which is of great concern to the developing world because of the often 
cited brain drain. The fear is that a proactive migration policy of labor-importing 
countries will lead to the recruitment of the intellectual elite of the developing world by 
the developed world. The return on education is low in the developing world, thus 
more highly educated individuals face considerable incentives to migrate. The data 
show that migrants typically are well educated, especially if the target country is 
relatively far away. Low-skilled labor, however, often cannot acquire the necessary 
means to finance emigration unless the target country is relatively close (as in the 
case of the United States and Mexico or Spain and Morocco). 
 
The problem of the labor-exporting countries is that they finance the education 
of their intellectual elite only to see these people leave when they have finished their 
education. The developing economies cannot reap the benefits and potential 
spillover effects from the human capital formation they finance, and the governments 
cannot benefit in terms of public finance because these people leave without paying 
taxes in their home country. The questions of interest are how much of this evidence 
is anecdotal, what is the real extent of the brain drain the developing world suffers 
from, and do these costs associated with brain drain exceed such benefits of 
migration as remittances and skill transfers. 
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The World Bank conducted a study on 24 labor-exporting countries and found 
that small countries close to large labor-importing regions are most likely to suffer 
from brain drain. Of the MENA-20 countries, Tunisia and Morocco stand out with a 
share 33.3 and 43.5 percent, respectively, of their tertiary-educated people living in 
OECD countries (table 15).
58 Large countries like Egypt suffer less from brain drain 
because they have a much larger base of tertiary-educated people. The outflow of 
tertiary-educated migrants seems to be fairly independent of the size of the country, 
mainly as a result of visa quotas in labor-importing countries, which usually do not 
reflect the population size of sending countries. In the case of Europe, one therefore 




                                                 
58. See Adams (2003).   22
Part III Institutional Requirements and Changes to 
Move toward Win-Win Solutions 
 
To move toward a win-win situation, policy adjustments and changes in the receiving 
countries and sending countries—and, perhaps most important, cooperation between 
them—in a number of key areas are required. 
 
8  Areas for Review in Receiving Countries 
 
In pursuit of a proactive migration approach, the EU and its member states will need 
new recruitment strategies to manage economically motivated migration. To this end, 
several gates of entry need to be reviewed, which may combine the advantages of 
existing selection and admission mechanisms already implemented by some of the 
TCIs: (a) Admissions sponsored by domestic employers, based on labor market 
testing, or both may be used to make the selection of immigrants sensitive to 
immediate economic needs. (b) Temporary work programs and student visas will not 
automatically lead to permanent status but may be used to preselect some of those 
who later may qualify for permanent status. This makes immigration programs for 
temporary labor easier to manage and provides better information on potential 
permanent immigrants, allowing greater selectivity. (c) Admissions based on 
individual applications and selection via a points system may be considered to bring 
in young, talented, and highly motivated immigrants with the skills that benefit the 
economy of the receiving country most. (d) Long-term and permanent immigrants 
may be allowed (and perhaps even encouraged) to bring family members along, a 
strategy that may help newcomers integrate more easily. These family members may 
be given access to the labor markets to maximize potential gains from migration and 
avoid any unnecessary welfare dependency of newcomers. 
 
Both temporary migrants and permanent immigrants, as well as their children, 
should benefit from social protection and should have access to services provided by 
educational and health care institutions in the receiving society on the basis of similar 
rights and equal treatment.
59 The EU and its member states should also clearly 
define guiding principles for the social and political integration of long-term or 
permanent immigrants
60, offering them some sort of “civic citizenship.”
61 When 
fulfilling basic residency requirements,
62 they should not only be eligible for 
naturalization, but also have the right to become citizens of their new country of 
residence. Wherever acquisition of citizenship via ius sanguinis prevails, the children 
                                                 
59. As stated by the European Council in Tampere (1999): “The legal status of third-country 
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of immigrants should have a legal claim to “fast-track” naturalization, particularly if 
they attended a school in the new country. Integration policies would have to include 
not only laws facilitating that goal but also targeted measures against discrimination 
against immigrants and their children.
63 
 
The selection and admission of migrants based on a proactive migration policy 
as well as the subsequent integration of long-term immigrants can and will work only 
if supported by a majority of people in the receiving society. This is not just a matter 
of legal and institutional change or political declaration. The necessity of such 
changes has to be communicated along with potential benefits and challenges 
deriving from a proactive migration regime. And alternatives such as a rise in 
pensionable age, lower public pensions, or decreasing quality of services provided by 
the health care sector should be openly discussed.
64 
 
In most of the old EU member states (EU 15), immigrants from middle and low 
income countries—in particular from the Maghreb and Turkey— have lower labor 
force participation rates and higher unemployment rates than natives.
65 This clearly 
indicates a mismatch between the skills of people migrating to Europe and the 
requirements of Europe’s formal labor markets. Such gaps are partly related to the 
predominant gates of entry, that is, asylum and family unification instead of proactive 
selection and admission. But they are also the result of regulations excluding legal 
foreign residents from certain sectors of formal labor markets. They also hint at 
hidden barriers and eventual discrimination. Any successful migration policy must 
therefore be followed by an active integration policy, otherwise receiving societies 
can fully profit from neither the complementary labor and skills acquired through 
migration nor additional tax and social security contributions—and migrants cannot 
make full use of their talent and skills. 
 
 
9  Areas for Review in Sending Countries 
 
Sending countries with low per capita income and high unemployment usually are not 
opposed to the emigration of parts of their population. So far, however, several of 
them are not putting much emphasis on orderly departure and safe travel 
arrangements for people leaving their territory. Many sending countries are also 
reluctant to repatriate nationals who have entered another country without a 
necessary visa, whose residence permits have expired, or whose claims for asylum 
have been rejected. Some countries even seem unwilling to help in identifying their 
nationals abroad and issuing travel documents. Most receiving countries see these 
as problems that have a negative impact on bilateral relations.  
 
Sending countries should also lobby, wherever necessary, to help their 
citizens get access to social security (in particular, pension and unemployment 
                                                 
63. In 2000, two directives on antidiscrimination policies were adopted by the European 
Council (Council Directive 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC). Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom had already developed their own national antidiscrimination legislation before 
the directives. See Bauböck (2004). 
64. This is discussed in Holzmann (forthcoming). 
65. See Münz and Fassmann (2004) and European Commission/Directorate General 
Employment and Social Affairs (2003), chapter 6.   24
insurance) and to such services as health care and education. By the same token, 
governments of sending countries should give returning migrants access to social 
services and social protection at home. These governments should also help 
returning migrants to keep their claims toward social welfare systems in the countries 
where they worked as migrants.   
 
Sending countries should also develop an interest in strengthening ties with 
their emigrants diasporas. This may include preferential treatment for descendants of 
emigrants and certain political and other rights for emigrants and citizens abroad, 
including the right to vote; to sell, buy, or inherit property; and to remain citizens of 
the sending country when naturalizing in the receiving country. In some European 
countries, the last point is a politically sensitive issue. 
 
 
10 Areas  of  Cooperation between Sending and Receiving 
Countries for Win-Win Solutions 
 
10.1  Bilateral Exit and Entry Controls and Joint Recruitment Strategies 
 
The goal of a comprehensive approach to migration policy outlined in this note is not 
only to implement proactive elements but also to gain a certain degree of control over 
the quantity and quality of the migration flow and subsequently reduce illegal 
immigration. In this context, the cooperation of the EU and its member states with the 
sending countries is crucial to move toward a regime of orderly departure and arrival 
and effective entry and exit controls. This also implies action against human 
trafficking and human smuggling, as well as attempts to decrease the death toll—
particularly in the Mediterranean area. Such measures, however, must not force 
sending countries to impose travel and mobility restrictions on their citizens. 
 
Such measures (in particular, tighter border controls), which effectively 
increase the entry costs for irregular migrants, are foremost in the interest of the 
receiving countries. They should therefore be accompanied by a review of visa types, 
visa allocations, and labor permits to simultaneously decrease the entry costs for 
legally admitted migrants. In exchange for improved border cooperation, the EU and 
its member states might offer an attractive number of visa and labor permits for 
citizens of sending countries. Such a package could contain a combination of 
temporary and permanent visas and link recruitment of migrants with skill levels, 
knowledge of language, and other required features.  
 
Labor-exporting countries close to regions attracting large numbers of 
migrants typically are a main source for unskilled (and often irregular) labor 
migration. If the EU and its member states wish to reduce irregular migration related 
to this issue, they should recruit most of the unskilled labor needed to remedy labor 
shortages in certain sectors from countries with a common border or in the vicinity of 
the EU. Countries with a small population that are close to labor-importing regions 
are most likely to suffer considerable brain drain (for example, Albania, Moldova, 
Morocco, and Tunisia with respect to the EU). It may be in the interest of such 
countries to try to reduce the outflow of highly skilled and well-educated citizens while 
negotiating for more generous quotas for their unskilled labor. From their point of 
view, highly skilled migrants should be recruited from larger countries with an   25
extensive tertiary-educated population, such as Egypt; and from more distant 
countries, such as India and China.  
 
Finally, Europe will also need the cooperation of the governments of sending 
countries for repatriation of migrants who have entered an EU country and the 
Schengen area without the necessary visa, whose residence permits have expired, 
or whose claims for asylum have been rejected. 
 
 
10.2  Secure and Enhance Remittance Flows and Access to the Banking System 
 
Remittances are an important area of potential cooperation between sending and 
receiving countries. First, governments should aim at securing the flows of 
remittances by improving the reach of money sent home by migrant workers. 
Second, in doing so, governments should also try to enhance remittance flows by 
reducing the fees associated with such transfers. Currently, these fees are relatively 
high, especially for irregular migrants and migrants without access to a bank account. 
Lower fees would almost certainly lead to more (official) remittances. 
 
Today, most remittances are relatively small, amounting to less than 
US$1,000 annually (figure 9) and to less than US$100 per transfer. Fees are usually 
substantial, especially when there are only major money transfer organizations 
(MTOs)
66 and informal channels available. The MTOs’ fees usually exceed 10 
percent of the amount sent (figure 7). 
 
There are already various examples of how viable and cheaper alternatives to 
MTOs and informal channels can be developed. These efforts revolve around banks 
and credit unions. In countries where alternatives exist because the local banking 
sector is sufficiently developed, fees are considerably lower (figure 8). A good 
example is the establishment of a clearinghouse between the U.S. and Mexican 
banking systems, which greatly improved money transfer procedures between these 
two countries.  
 
Another example is the introduction of the International Remittance Network 
(IRnet) by the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) in 2001, which brought 
together credit unions from the United States and six Central American and 
Caribbean countries. IRnet was able to reduce average fees for remittances to 2.6 
percent. The value of distributed remittances has been growing, from US$2.5 million 
in the forth quarter of 2001 to US$64 million in the forth quarter of 2003. In Europe, 




The driving factors to accomplish fee reductions are cost cuts stemming from 
network sharing and technological innovation. The upfront costs of establishing 
money transfer systems with a sufficiently large number of outlets at both the sending 
and the receiving sides, as well as associated network externalities, result in the 
money transfer industry tending to display features of imperfect competition, which 
leads to higher pricing. Regulations to increase competition, subsidies for the 
                                                 
66. The most important MTOs are Western Union and Money Gram. 
67. As described in World Council of Credit Unions (2004).   26
establishment of new networks, or the encouragement of cooperation between 
different providers are a few of the available policy options. 
 
It might be interesting to look at the lessons learned from the European 
experience of reducing transfer fees within the euro zone. Western European banks 
and credit unions could have a comparative advantage in the money transfer 
sector—on the one hand, because of their experience with the introduction of the 
single currency and, on the other hand, because of their acquisitions of banks and 
joint ventures with banks in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Besides securing and enhancing the flows of remittances, it is also necessary 
to consolidate the flows by engaging in the development of the banking and financial 
sector of the receiving country. Alongside the exponentially growing market for official 
remittances, this constitutes a business opportunity for European banks and credit 
unions. Distributing remittances requires presence in regions where family members 
of successful migrants live. It can be assumed that many receivers of remittances in 
these areas do not participate in the banking system. In the case of WOCCU, credit 
unions at the receiving end actively encourage receivers of remittances to open 
accounts and saving deposits when they pick up their money. If implemented 
consistently, such a strategy would help to increase the share of the population that 
participates in the banking sector, guaranteeing people better access to financial 
products.
68 Countries might also encourage migrants and their family members to 
make productive use of remittances beyond consumption, for example, by investing 
part of the transferred money in housing, health, and education. 
 
Beyond the aim of securing the flow of remittances, there is a general need to 
give migrants access to checking accounts and financial services—in particular, bank 
loans. This would help them to set up new businesses and expand existing ones. It 
would also enhance both economic integration and economic performance of 
migrants because, on average, they engage more often in entrepreneurial activities 
than the native-born population. Such activities based on ethnic entrepreneurship 
and ethnic networks can promote foreign direct investment (FDI), tourism, and trade 
beneficial to both sending and receiving countries. 
 
 
10.3  Social Protection and Access to Social Services for Migrant Workers 
 
Governments of sending countries have (or should have) an interest in their citizens 
being protected against exploitation or unfavorable working conditions and having 
sufficient access to such social services as health care, education, unemployment 
insurance, and pension systems while living and working abroad. At the same time, 
receiving countries are not always willing or prepared to offer full social protection to 
migrant workers and their families and give them access to social services. Reduced 
access to welfare provisions is even seen as a policy tool that can make a receiving 
country less attractive to certain categories of migrants. Also, migrants may not have 
spent enough time in a particular country to be entitled to claim certain welfare 
                                                 
68. In the case of Guatemala, where 25 credit unions who are part of WOCCU’s IRnet serve 
more than 500,000 members with 121 points of service in mainly rural areas, nonmember remittance 
receivers were at first joining at a rate of 14 percent. As business increased, however, less effort could 
be spent on each walk-in customer. In recent months, nonmember receivers were joining at a rate of 
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provisions. In addition, they may have no claim when they return to their country of 
origin. 
 
In this context, sending and receiving countries should develop mechanisms 
guaranteeing transferability of social welfare benefits such as pensions and health 
insurance. Such mechanisms could encourage return migration. An increase in the 
return rate should also have positive effects on the cost of the health care system. If 
a migrant who is covered by health insurance in the receiving country returns to his 
or her country of origin—for example, to settle after retirement—and if he or she 
claims health care services there, the costs will certainly be lower than claiming the 
same health care services in the receiving country.  
 
It can be assumed that both return migration of older migrants and some 
retirement migration among native-born citizens of EU member states will increase in 
the future. Mediterranean regions with a favorable climate (for example, southern 
Turkey) could become prime destinations. Again, the EU and its member states have 
an interest in their citizens being able to claim pensions and health care (eventually 
at lower costs) in these countries, which adds to the incentives to engage in political 
dialogue and negotiate bilateral agreements.  
 
 
10.4  Strengthening Transnational Communities 
 
In its communication on migration and relations with third countries, the European 
Commission
69 mentions the strengthening of transnational communities. Enabling 
migrants to keep ties with their country of origin might have several effects: In any 
case, it increases economic, social, and cultural ties between Europe and a larger 
number of countries, thus enhancing economic and other opportunities. 
 
Maintaining loyalty to the former home country, a particular community in this 
country, or the extended family network may increase the willingness to provide 
economic support through remittances, as well as invest in the old home country, 
start business initiatives, engage in political activities, and encourage other 
engagements of migrants from the country of origin. 
 
Migrant diasporas living in Europe or Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the 
United States often support democratization for countries with nondemocratic rule 
“back home,” and they also serve as pools for alternative elites that may become 
relevant after political changes. However, diaspora politics might lead to the 
importation of emerging or existing conflicts among or within former home countries 
of migrants. Such importation of violent or potentially violent conflicts can become a 
threat to internal security and public order of declared and undeclared immigration 
countries, and it could lead to a radicalization within established migrant populations. 
 
 
10.5  Skill Formation and Codevelopment  
 
One way of dealing with skills shortages in Europe is the formation of additional skills 
in neighboring and other world regions. The EU could sponsor training of specifically 
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needed skills in schools and universities in the sending countries. Cofinancing of 
training centers and higher education helps the receiving countries to adjust required 
skills and respond to labor market changes.
 70 The sending country benefits from 
financial resources that are used for the education of future emigrants as well as 
additional human capital formation. Improvement of higher education and training 
may have spillover effects and could also lead to the mutual recognition of tertiary 
degrees.  
 
Support of educational facilities in neighboring regions would counterbalance 
potentially negative effects of brain drain for sending countries. It would also make it 
clear that the recruitment of educated and talented migrants by Europe is not taken 
as a de facto subsidy from the developing to the industrial world. Another proposal 
relating to the brain drain problem is to tax expatriates who received their education 
in the country of origin but left once they finished their education to work and live 
abroad. However, long-term immigrants should not have to pay higher taxes for 
comparable income than the native-born population, thus such taxation seems viable 
only if the receiving countries share a small amount of their tax revenues from 
migrants with the countries of origin of their immigrant work force. 
 
 
10.6 Trade-Migration  Link 
 
It is often stressed that according to economic theory, trade and migration are 
substitutes.
 71 In that sense, increased trade and the transfer of production facilities to 
low-income countries could serve as tools to reduce migration flows. But empirical 
studies are inconclusive as to whether trade and migration actually act as 
complements or substitutes.
72 In principle, reduction in trade barriers should increase 
trade, lower the wage differential, and ultimately reduce migration flows. By the same 
token, reduction of surplus labor through emigration should lead to higher wages in 
the sending country while lowering the wage level in certain low-skill labor market 
segments of receiving countries. This would increase the wage inequality within 
receiving countries. Yet the literature also concludes that under certain 
assumptions—for example, imperfect competition, differing technologies across 
countries, and external economies of scale—trade and migration can act as 
complements. In these cases, migration could eventually lead to a widening in the 
wage gap between sending and receiving countries and therefore worsen the 
situation in the sending country, reinforcing migration incentives.   
 
The effects predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model probably hold true for 
migration from Eastern to Western Europe, where migration costs are relatively low 
and increased trade and FDI already seem to have reduced migration flows 
considerably.
73 Where migration costs are important and credit constraints are 
binding for poorer migrants, trade and migration may be complements for low-skilled 
migrants and substitutes for high-skilled ones—in which case, trade liberalization and 
                                                 
70. Examples of schools training potential migrants for external labor markets include nursing 
schools in the Philippines with curricula preparing for work in the health care sector of developed 
countries and a medical school in Budapest that uses German as the teaching language. These 
institutions, however, are not financed by third countries that recruit graduates of these schools.  
71. Based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model; see Flam and Flander (1991). 
72. See Razin and Sadka (1997). 
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higher FDI can affect the skill composition of migrants.
74 Also, complementarity is 
more likely when migration is driven by networks between migrant populations and 
communities in sending countries. Such networks can substantially lower trade costs 
and therefore enhance trade along with migration.
75 
 
One option to address migration pressures is to encourage certain sectors that 
suffer from labor shortages to outsource parts of their production to countries with 
lower wages and a large supply of labor, which usually are also emigration countries. 
This is obviously a politically highly charged issue, but nevertheless the European 
Commission mentions it as a viable strategy in its communication on migration and 
relations with third countries.
76 Sectors with a potential for outsourcing to labor-
exporting countries are Europe’s and North America’s agricultural sector (shielded 
from competing products by import restrictions and tariff barriers), labor incentive 
segments of the manufacturing sector, and certain service sectors (for example, call 
centers, software development, back office work of banks and insurance companies). 
In practice, such strategies also depend upon Europe’s readiness to open EU and 
EEA markets to agricultural and other products (for example, textiles) that are 
processed or manufactured in third countries with surplus labor and lower wage 
costs. 
 
Negotiations on future bilateral and multilateral trade and cooperation 
agreements between the EU and neighboring or developing countries might well 
include and regulate both import-export and migration-related issues.
77 Among the 
latter are migration related to the export of services, mutual recognition of tertiary 
degrees and other certificates of educational attainment, visa regimes and labor 
permits, orderly departure and safe travel arrangements, living and working 
conditions of migrant workers and permanent immigrants, brain drain and skill 
formation, and transferability of claims toward social security. 
 
 
                                                 
74. This leads to the movement of more unskilled and fewer skilled migrants. 
75. As a positive side effect, such networks may also promote FDI, tourism, and other 
economic as well as civil society–related activities beneficial to the home country. 
76. See European Commission (2002). 
77. In the past, the Berne Initiative, an intergovernmental forum initiated and hosted by the 
Swiss government, has tried to promote discussion of the principles that should guide migration 
management. 
  For a proposal to extend the European-Mediterranean partnership through migration 
considerations for mutual benefit, see Diwan and others (2003).   30




International migration is caused by major economic, demographic, political, and 
security gaps between sending and receiving countries. But international migration is 
also a process with the potential to reduce such gaps. Therefore, sending and 
receiving countries should explore win-win solutions that allow the countries and 
economies involved as well as the migrants to gain from geographic mobility of labor 
and skills.  
 
From a European point of view, immigration should be seen as a partial 
answer to aging and eventually shrinking domestic societies. Migration can play such 
a role only if Europe is able to attract migrants with needed skill levels and these 
migrants have access to formal labor markets and the possibility to establish their 
own businesses. Europe will have to develop a comprehensive migration policy that 
balances economic and humanitarian aspects and incorporates selection and 
admission procedures for people who qualify for economic reasons as temporary 
migrants or as permanent immigrants. Experiences of TCIs—in particular, Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand—should be analyzed and adapted. In this context, the EU 
and its member states also have to review and improve integration policies and 
arrangements regulating claims of migrants to social security benefits (including the 
portability of such claims in case of remigration) and services such as education and 
health care. 
 
A permanent dialogue between the EU and sending countries could explore 
the possibility of cooperation in various migration-related fields.
78 Among them are 
joint border management, visa regimes and labor permits, orderly departure and safe 
travel arrangements, living and working conditions of migrant workers and permanent 
immigrants, brain drain and skill formation, cofinancing of educational systems, 
transferability and portability of claims toward social security, dual citizenship, 
channels, average costs, and productive use of remittances. Such migration-related 
issues might also become elements of future trade, cooperation, and association 
agreements between the EU and third countries.  
 
All attempts to develop and implement coherent migration regimes, as well as 
integration and citizenship policies, need public support among domestic populations 
and polities of sending and receiving societies. It is therefore necessary to explain 
why and how shaping—not preventing—future migration to Europe, influencing the 
characteristics of the migrants, and incorporating those who will (and should) stay for 
an extended period can be managed in the best interests of both migrants and 
Europeans themselves. 
 
                                                 
78. The United States and Mexico have installed a permanent binational commission. Among 
the issues on their binational agenda are border safety, smuggling and trafficking, return of convicted 
criminals, and the rights of migrant workers. France has similar bilateral consultations with several 
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Central America and the Dominican Republic.   31
Such an implementation and management strategy has short-term and long-
term horizons. For example, lowering costs of remittances and securing such flows 
has an immediate positive impact on migrants and remittance-receiving countries 
and should be undertaken without delay. On the other side of the timeline, shrinking 
native populations and work forces in many EU member states will be an issue for 
the next 15 to 20 years and beyond. But even here, it makes sense to analyze the 
implications of demographic trends well before they could negatively influence 
Europe’s economic performance and the welfare of its citizens. Sound migration 
policies responding to such trends will have to be implemented gradually, and some 
degree of trial and error will be inevitable. Furthermore, if the EU envisages 
recruitment of skilled migrants in wider Europe and other world regions, the buildup 
of such skills would be enhanced if people in sending countries can anticipate the 
possibility of later emigration to Europe. In this context, a long-term migration 
strategy formulated by the EU and its member states may have a crucial signaling 
function that could influence both expectations and future investment of individuals in 
secondary and higher education.  
 
The EU also has to consider to what extent future enlargement (or some form 
of association) will lead to the integration of countries with growing populations and 
work forces (for example, Turkey). This would shift some of the challenge from the 
management of international migration to that of intra-EU mobility. In the medium and 
long term, however, even an enlarged EU may face the need to attract more 
migrants from more distant world regions with comparable education systems (for 
example, South Asia). 
 
 
12  Agenda for Further Research and Analysis 
 
No sound policy advise can be given and no knowledge base can be expanded in the 
fields of international migration, immigrant integration and the identification of win-win 
solutions without accurate data and information. Therefore further research and 
analytical efforts are necessary in following areas: 
  
•  Improvement of data quality. Today research and policy making are restricted 
due to the poor quality and scarce availability of data on certain crucial aspects 
of migration, particularly the most basic data on the quantity and composition of 
migration flows and financial data on remittances.  
 
•  Learning from troaditional countries of immigration. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and – to a somewhat smaller extent also – the USA have a long 
tradition of pro-active recruitment of immigrants. Comparative analysis should 
focus on these experiences and help to identify pro-active strategies that could 
be of relevance to Europe. 
 
•  Labor market effects. The effects of international migration on the labor markets  
are of major concern to both sending and receiving countries,. Research is 
needed on the implications of temporary versus permanent migration, skilled 
versus unskilled migration with the goal of deriving best practices and policy 
recommendations for migration issues associated with further EU enlargement 
negotiations, regional agreements on migration and free-trade negotiations at 
the Word Trade Organization.   32
 
•  Brain drain. The emigration of highly skilled workers has been accelerated by 
the introduction of selective policies in various receiving countries. This is a 
topic of great concern to low-income and middle-income countries. Further 
research should help identifying under which circumstances labor-sending 
countries suffer from the outflow of human capital and under which 
circumstances the associated remittance flows and skill transfers benefit 
sending countries.  
 
•  Access to social services and transferability of social benefits and 
entitlements. From a research point of view social protection of international 
migrants is a largely unexplored field. Among the core issues are labor 
standards, the access of migrant workers to such social services as health 
care and education, and the transferability of such social benefits as health 
insurance and entitlement for old-age pension. 
 
•  Social and political integration. Any successful migration policy must be 
complemented by an active integration policy, otherwise neither receiving 
societies nor migrants themselves can fully profit from mobility of labor and 
skills or the admission of refugees. From a research point of view best 
practises should be compared. In particular the relation between economic 
performance, acquisistion of citizenship and social integration needs more 
attention. The question, to what extent naturalization and additional political 
rights for legal foreign residents are substitutes, is of particular interest. 
 
•  Remittances. Given the growing importance of remittances as a source of 
capital for the developing world, high priority should be given to research on 
the determinants of remittance flows and on best practices for the use of 
remittances. One particular aim could also be to help reducing remittance fees 
and evaluate various policies with respect to them. 
 
•  Ties with the diaspora. Diaspoa formation and the ability to maintain 
functioning networks within the migrant populations can help to encourage skill 
transfer through return migration of skilled labor, small and medium-size 
enterprise development through investments of return migrants, and 
remittance flows in general. The existence of such ties can also induce trade 
and FDI. In this context he emergence of transnational communities and larger 
immigrant groups holding dual citizenship are important research topics. 
 
•  Development impact and poverty reduction. Migration could be seen as an 
important tool to cope with demand shocks and economic depressions. For a 
few developing countries, no substantial development may be possible without 
significant out-migration. Under such circumstances it is desirable to explore 
best practises of migration management ideally based on cooperation and 
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Note: Authors’ own calculations are based on United Nations (U.N.) population projections for 2025 and International Labour Office (ILO) 
national labor participation rates across sex and age groups for 2010. 
Source: U.N. Common Database, ILO Economically Active Population database, and authors’ own calculations. 
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Note: Authors’ own calculations based on U.N. population projections for 2050 and ILO national labor participation rates across sex and 
age groups for 2010. 
Source: U.N. Common Database, ILO Economically Active Population database, and authors’ own calculations. 
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a. Across all countries worldwide, the expected value of the indicator is 0, with a standard deviation of 1. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).   48



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a. Across all countries worldwide, the expected value of the indicator is 0, with a standard deviation of 1. 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). 
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Source: Orozco (2003).  50













































Source: Orozco (2003).  51
Figure 9 Average Annual Amounts of Remittances Sent from the United States to Selected Countries 






















Source: Orozco 2003.   52




















































Official flows  53




Note: Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA): LSIA1 refers to immigrants who arrived between September 1993 and August 1995, LSIA2 
refers to immigrants who arrived between September 1999 and August 2000. 
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Note: LSIA1 refers to immigrants who arrived between September 1993 and August 1995, LSIA2 refers to immigrants who arrived between 
September 1999 and August 2000. 
Source: DIMIA (2003). 
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Table 1 Total, Foreign Resident and Immigrant Population (EU 15), 2000-2003, 
Different Data Sources Compared 
 

















































Belgium 10,356  853 847 784 879 n.a. 974  1,034
Denmark  5,384  256 267 166 304 322 225 227
Germany  82,537  7,344 7,319 5,444 7,349 9,700 n.a. 8,915
Greece  11,018  161 762 362 534 n.a. 489 480
Spain 40,683  801  1,109 450 1,259 2,664 858  664
France  (6) 59,629  3,263 3,263 2,724 6,277 5,868 4,605 1,327
Ireland  3,964  127 151 118 310 n.a. 232 263
Italy 57,321  1,271  1,363 n.a. 1,634 2,500 n.a.  511
Luxemburg 448  148 167 161 162 145 127 119
Netherlands 16,193  652  690 555 1,576 1,675 1,179 1,593
Austria  8,067  754 764 695 756 893 899 798
Portugal 10,408  191 224 106 233 n.a. 1,119  1,313
Finland  5,206  88 99 50 134 145 81 86
Sweden  8,941  487 476 295 993 1,028 681 933
UK  59,329  2,298 2,587 2,026 4,029 n.a. 3,307 4,467
Total    (N)  379,484  18,692 20,088 13,936 26,429 24,940 14,776 22,730
 
(1)  Eurostat, year end population 2002; (2) LFS 2002; (3) UN Population Division, Data for 2000 or latest 
available year; (4) Data for Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden are from national Population 
Registers, data for France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Austria are from the most recent national 
censuses, data for Spain (2003) are from local municipalities' registers, data for Germany are rough 
estimates based on foreigners registers, naturalization statistics and an Allbus survey estimate for ethnic 
German Aussiedler taking only immigration after 1950 into account (see Münz and Ulrich 2003), data for 
Italy (2003) are rough estimates based on residency permits (various categories) and an estimate for 
foreign children not required to hold residency permits (Einaudi 2004); (5) LFS 2002, Data for Germany 
and Italy are not available; (6) Chronos data, Sopemi data and Census data for France are from 1999. 
  
Source: Münz and Fassmann (2004), EUROSTAT Chronos DB, LFS, OECD/Sopemi, UN Population 
Division, various national sources   56
Table 2 Foreign Labor Force in Selected European Countries in 2000 
 
  
Foreign Labor Force (% of 
total labor force) 
Foreign Labor 
Force, total   
Austria  10.5 398,622 
Belgium 8.9 378,243* 
Czech Republic  2.0 115,431 
Denmark 3.4 100,076 
Finland  1.5 39,109* 
France 6.0 1,603,185 
Germany  8.8 3,599,877 
Hungary 0.9 43,645 
Ireland  3.7 59,619 
Italy 3.6 926,271 
Luxembourg  57.3 107,091 
Netherlands 3.4 248,452** 
Norway  4.9 114,431 
Portugal 2.0 101,681  
Slovak Republic  0.2 5,864* 
Spain 1.2 211,736* 
Sweden  5.0 239,951 
Switzerland 18.3 707,294 
United Kingdom  4.4 1,293,649 
* 1999 values       
** 1998 values       
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators database. 
 
Table 3 Net Migration to Western Europe, 1960–2000 
 




2000  1990-2000 1960-2000   
Per 1000  Per 1000  in 1000  in % of total pop.  in 1000  in % of total pop. 
Austria 3.6  1.9  294 3.6 602 7.5 
Belgium 1.5  1.0  153 1.5 400 3.9 
Denmark 2.5  1.1  129 2.4 226 4.2 
Finland 1.3  -0.5  64 1.2 -76 -1.5 
France 1.0  1.8  585 1.0 3,855 6.5 
Germany 4.4  2.6  3,638 4.4 8,495 10.4 
Greece 4.2  1.0  442 4.2 469 4.4 
Iceland -0.4  -1.1  -1 -0.4 -10 -3.5 
Ireland 2.4  -1.6  91 2.4 -194 -5.1 
Italy 2.0  0.0  1,177 2.0 273 0.5 
Luxembourg 10.0  6.5  42 9.7 100 22.8 
Netherlands 2.3  1.7  360 2.3 1,004 6.3 
Norway 2.0  1.1  88 2.0 186 4.2 
Portugal 0.3  -3.4  35 0.4 -1,162 -11.6 
Spain 0.9  0.0  358 0.9 72 0.2 
Sweden 2.2  2.0  194 2.2 670 7.6 
Switzerland 3.3  3.1  235 3.3 804 11.2 
U. Kingdom  1.5  0.4  827 1.4 941 1.6 
Source: U.N. (2003), Brücker (2002), Laczco and Münz (2003).   57
 















   in 1,000  per 1,000 population  in 1,000 
EU-25 453,685  10.4 9.9 0.5 2.2 2.7  454,905
Germany 82,537  8.6 10.4 -1.8 1.9 0.1  82,545
France 59,629  12.7 9.2 3.5 1.0 4.5  59,896
UK 59,329  11.6 10.2 1.4 1.7 3.2  59,518
Italy 57,321  9.4 10.3 -0.8 3.6 2.8  57,482
Spain 40,683  10.7 9.0 1.7 5.5 7.2  40,978
Poland 38,219  9.2 9.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6  38,194
Netherlands 16,193  12.6 8.8 3.8 0.2 4.0  16,258
Greece 11,018  9.3 9.4 -0.1 2.7 2.6  11,047
Portugal 10,408  10.8 9.9 0.9 6.1 6.9  10,480
Belgium 10,356  10.7 10.2 0.6 3.4 3.9  10,397
Czech Rep.  10,203  8.9 10.5 -1.6 2.4 0.8  10,211
Hungary 10,142  9.5 13.4 -3.9 1.2 -2.7  10,115
Sweden 8,941  11.0 10.4 0.6 3.2 3.8  8,975
Austria 8,067  9.5 9.6 0.0 3.1 3.1  8,092
Denmark 5,384  12.0 10.7 1.3 1.3 2.6  5,398
Slovakia 5,379  9.6 9.6 0.0 0.3 0.3  5,381
Finland 5,206  10.8 9.2 1.6 1.1 2.7  5,220
Ireland 3,964  15.5 7.3 8.3 7.0 15.3  4,025
Lithuania 3,463  8.8 11.8 -3.0 -1.4 -4.5  3,447
Latvia 2,332  8.8 14.1 -5.2 -0.3 -5.6  2,319
Slovenia 1,995  8.6 9.6 -1.0 1.8 0.8  1,997
Estonia 1,356  9.6 13.3 -3.7 -0.1 -3.8 1,351
Cyprus 715  11.1 7.8 3.3 14.1 17.4  728
Luxembourg 448  11.5 8.5 3.0 2.5 5.6  451
Malta 397  10.0 8.2 1.8 3.9 5.7  400
Iceland 289  14.1 6.3 7.8 -0.9 6.9  291
Liechtenstein 34  11.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 11.7  34
Norway 4,552  12.0 9.4 2.6 2.5 5.1  4,576
EEA 458,560  10.4 9.9 0.5 2.2 2.7  459,806
Switzerland 7,324  9.7 8.5 1.2 6.0 7.2  7,377
Accession countries  29,619  9.3 12.8 -3.5 - -3.5  29,515
Bulgaria 7,846  8.4 14.3 -5.9 - -5.9  7,799
Romania 21,773  9.6 12.2 -2.6 - -2.6  21,716
 
Source: EUROSTAT (2004). 












Intl. Migrants as 
Share of World 
Population 
Annual Change 
during the period 
starting in this year 
 millions  billions  %  millions 
1965 75  3.3 2.3% 1.0
1975 85  4.1 2.1% 2.0
1985 105  4.8  2.2% 1.5
1990
b 120  5.3  2.3% 8.8
1995
b 164  5.7  2.9% 2.2
2000 175  6.0  2.9% ..
2004
c 185  6.3  2.9% ..
 
a. Standard U.N. criteria define international migrants as persons residing outside their country of 
birth or citizenship for 12 months or more. But for its statistics, the U.N. Population Division has to rely 
on national data sources. Some countries define migrants according to different criteria; others publish 
data on legal foreign residents (see table 1) but not on the foreign-born population. 
b. Some of the 1985–95 increase in the number of migrants reflects people who did not actually 
move but became international migrants through the breakup of their countries (for example, the 
former Czechoslovakia, former Soviet Union, and former Yugoslavia). 
c. The value for 2004 is based on the assumption that the number of international migrants during 
the period 2000–04 grew at the same pace as during the period 1995–2000; see Münz (2004). 
Source: U.N. Population Division (2002), Martin (2003), Münz (2004).   59
 
Table 6 Labor Force Participation and Projected Population Decline, 2000–2050, in 
Selected European Countries, Age Group 15–64 Years 
 
 
Labor Force Participation Rate 2000,  
Age Group 15-64 years 
(Persons aged 15-64 years employed or searching employment 
as percentage of total population aged 15-64 years) 
 >75%  66-75%  <66% 




































Decline of the Age Group 
15-64 years 2000 – 2025 


















Source: U.N. (2003), OECD Online Database, Laczco and Münz (2003).   60
 







GDP per capita (current 
US$) 
Austria  188,545,515,520 8,132,000 23,186 
Belgium  229,609,570,304 10,286,000 22,323 
Cyprus  9,131,123,712 760,650 12,004 
Czech Republic  56,784,211,968 10,224,000 5,554 
Denmark  161,542,389,760 5,359,000 30,144 
Estonia 5,524,955,648 1,364,000 4,051 
Finland  120,855,298,048 5,188,000 23,295 
France 1,309,806,559,232 59,190,600 22,129 
Germany  1,846,068,510,720 82,333,000 22,422 
Greece 117,168,726,016 10,590,870 11,063 
Hungary  51,926,491,136 10,187,000 5,097 
Ireland 103,298,408,448 3,839,000 26,908 
Italy  1,088,754,286,592 57,948,000 18,788 
Latvia 7,549,044,736 2,359,000 3,200 
Lithuania  11,992,000,512 3,482,000 3,444 
Luxembourg 18,539,986,944 441,000 42,041 
Malta  3,622,939,904 395,000 9,172 
Netherlands 380,137,111,552 16,039,000 23,701 
Norway  166,145,196,032 4,513,000 36,815 
Poland 176,256,204,800 38,641,000 4,561 
Portugal  109,802,496,000 10,024,000 10,954 
Slovak Republic  20,459,104,256 5,404,000 3,786 
Slovenia  18,810,353,664 1,992,000 9,443 
Spain 581,822,971,904 41,117,000 14,150 
Sweden  209,813,782,528 8,894,000 23,590 
Switzerland 247,090,724,864 7,231,000 34,171 
United Kingdom  1,424,094,003,200 58,800,000 24,219 
EU-25+, NOR, CH (2001)  8,665,151,968,000 464,734,120 18,645 







GDP per capita (current 
US-$) 
Albania  4,113,723,392 3,164,400 1,300 
Armenia 2,117,765,888 3,088,000 686 
Azerbaijan  5,585,046,528 8,116,110 688 
Belarus 12,218,720,256 9,970,260 1,226 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4,769,110,016 4,060,000 1,175 
Bulgaria 13,552,988,160 7,913,000 1,713 
Croatia  20,260,491,264 4,380,780 4,625 
Georgia 3,138,404,096 5,224,000 601 
Kazakhstan  22,389,143,552 14,895,310 1,503 
Kyrgyz Republic  1,525,245,056 4,955,000 308 
Macedonia  3,425,929,984 2,035,000 1,684 
Moldova 1,479,386,752 4,270,000 346 
Romania  38,717,915,136 22,408,000 1,728 
Russian Federation  309,951,201,280 144,752,000 2,141 
Serbia and Montenegro  10,861,249,536 10,651,000 1,020 
Tajikistan 1,055,504,192 6,244,730 169 
Turkey  147,682,721,792 68,529,000 2,155 
Turkmenistan 5,961,538,560 5,435,000 1,097 
Ukraine  37,587,689,472 49,093,000 766 
Uzbekistan 11,269,735,424 25,068,000 450 
EECA-20 (2001)  657,663,510,336 404,252,590 1,627 
   
Algeria  53,454,692,352 30,835,000 1,734 
Bahrain 7,970,690,560 651,000 12,244 
Djibouti  552,928,512 644,330 858 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  99,427,565,568 65,176,940 1,526 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  101,561,729,024 64,528,160 1,574 
Iraq .. 23,750,180 .. 
Israel  110,385,553,408 6,362,950 17,348 
Jordan 8,451,339,776 5,030,800 1,680 
Kuwait  35,830,480,896 2,044,270 17,527 
Lebanon 16,488,225,792 4,384,680 3,760 
Libya  34,136,625,152 5,410,780 6,309 
Morocco 33,345,392,640 29,170,000 1,143 
Oman  19,825,747,968 2,478,000 8,001 
Qatar 16,454,120,448 597,550 27,536 
Saudi Arabia  188,720,955,392 21,408,470 8,815 
Syrian Arab Republic  17,896,208,384 16,593,210 1,079 
Tunisia  19,462,098,944 9,673,600 2,012 
United Arab Emirates  46480601088 2,976,290 15,617 
West Bank, Gaza (Palest.)  4,359,139,840 3,089,540 1,411 
Yemen, Rep.  9,177,179,136 18,045,750 509 
MENA-20 (2000)  823,981,274,880 312,851,500 2,634 
      
Bahrain  7,970,690,560 651,000 12,244 
Kuwait 35,830,480,896 2,044,270 17,527 
Qatar  16,454,120,448 597,550 27,536 
Saudi Arabia  188,720,955,392 21,408,470 8,815 
United Arab Emirates  46480601088 2,976,290 15,617 
Gulf-5 (2000)  295,456,848,384 27,677,580 10,675 
 
Source: World Bank,  World Development Indicators database.   62
Table 8 Officially Registered Remittances to Developing Countries, 1988–2002 
 
  Remits (US-$ bn)  Change (%) 
1988  28 
1989 32  13%
1990  39  22%
1991 33  -15%
1992  37  13%
1993 39  5%
1994  44  14%
1995 51  15%
1996  55  8%
1997 65  19%
1998  61  -6%
1999 65  7%
2000  65  -1%
2001 72  12%
2002  80  11%
Source: IMF (2002).   63
Table 9 Remittances Flows of Selected Countries in 2002 
(US$ million) 
 
Sending Countries    Receiving Countries 
Austria  -373  Albania 643
Belgium -268  Azerbaijan  163
France  -2,524  Bosnia and Herzegovina  519
Germany -3,277  Croatia  666
Japan  -2,414  France 761
Kazakhstan -286  Georgia  46
Netherlands  -618  Greece 1,181
New Zealand  -175  Hungary  39
Portugal  -541  India 8,317
Russian Federation  -296  Ireland  57
Spain  -2,249  Japan 947
Switzerland -2,018  Kazakhstan  107
United States  -22,994 Lithuania  35
   Macedonia  92
   Morocco 2,877
   Portugal  3,224
   Russian  Federation  123
   Spain  3,958
   Tunisia  1,071
   Turkey  1,936
   Ukraine  133
Source: IMF (2002). 
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Table 10 Inflows of Seasonal Workers in Selected OECD Countries 
 
      1991  1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Australia  36.7  25.2  25.6 29.6 35.4 40.3 50.0 55.6 62.6  71.5 76.6
Canada  ..   11.1   11.2  10.4  10.9 .. .. .. ..  .. ..
France   54.2   13.6   11.3  10.3  9.4  8.8  8.2  7.5 7.6  7.9 10.8
Germany  ..   212.4   181.0  155.2  192.8  220.9  226.0  207.9 230.3  263.8 277.9
Italy  ..   1.7   2.8  5.8  7.6  8.9  8.4  16.5 20.4  30.9 30.3
Norway   4.3   4.7   4.6  4.5  5.0  5.4  6.1  7.5 8.6  9.9 11.9
Switzerland   147.5   126.1   93.5  83.9  72.3  62.7  46.7  39.6 45.3  49.3 54.9
United Kingdom  ..   3.6   4.2  4.4  4.7  5.5  9.3  9.4 9.8  10.1 15.2
United States  ..   16.4   16.3  13.2  11.4  9.6 ..  27.3 32.4  33.3 27.7
Source: OECD (2003). 
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Table 11 Inflows of Asylum Seekers in Selected OECD Countries
a 
      1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002
Australia  4.9  8.1 7.8 8.1 11.1 8.1  8.4 11.9 12.4 6.0
Austria 4.7  5.1 5.9 7.0 6.7 13.8  20.1 18.3 30.1 37.1
Belgium  26.4  14.6 11.6 12.4 11.8 22.1  35.8 42.7 24.5 18.8
Bulgaria  - - 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.8  1.3 1.8 2.4 2.9
Canada  21.1  20.7 25.0 25.0 23.9 24.6  29.9 35.7 42.7 33.4
Czech  Republic  2.2 1.2 1.4 2.2 2.1 4.1 7.2 8.8 18.0 8.5
Denmark  14.3  6.7 5.1 5.9 5.1 5.7  6.5 10.3 12.4 5.9
Finland  2.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.3 3.1 3.2 1.7 3.4
France  27.6  26.0 20.4 17.4 21.4 22.4  30.9 38.7 47.3 50.8
Germany 322.6  127.2 127.9 116.4 104.4 98.6  95.1 78.6 88.4 71.1
Greece  0.8  1.3 1.4 1.6 4.4 2.6  1.5 3.1 5.5 5.7
Hungary 0.7  0.4 0.6 0.7 1.1 7.4  11.5 7.8 9.6 6.4
Ireland  0.1  0.4 0.4 1.2 3.9 4.6  7.7 10.9 10.3 11.6
Italy 1.3  1.8 1.7 0.7 1.9 11.1  33.4 24.5 9.8 7.3
Japan  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Luxembourg  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.6 2.9 0.6 0.7 1.0
Netherlands  35.4  52.6 29.3 22.9 34.4 45.2  42.7 43.9 32.6 18.7
New  Zealand  0.4 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.0
Norway  12.9  3.4 1.5 1.8 2.3 8.5  10.2 10.8 14.8 17.5
Poland  0.8 0.6 0.8 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.0 4.4 4.5 5.2
Portugal  1.7  0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3  0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Romania -  - - 0.6 1.4 1.2  1.7 1.4 2.4 1.1
Slovak Republic  0.1  0.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5  0.9 1.5 8.2 9.7
Spain 12.6  12.0 5.7 4.7 5.0 6.8  8.4 7.9 9.2 6.2
Sweden  37.6  18.6 9.0 5.8 9.6 12.5  11.2 16.3 23.5 33.0
Switzerland  24.7 16.1 17.0 18.0 24.0 41.3 46.1 17.6 20.8 26.2
United Kingdom  28.0  42.2 55.0 37.0 41.5 58.0  91.2 98.9 92.0 110.7
United States
b 200.4  202.4 208.2 150.0 73.1 50.3  45.8 57.0 86.4 81.1
EU-15  515.4 310.0 274.9 234.1 251.8 306.7 390.9 398.1 388.1 381.6
Western Europe
c  553.0 329.5 293.3 253.9 278.0 356.5 447.1 426.6 423.7 425.3
Central Eur., Eastern Balkans
d  3.8 2.4 3.7 7.4 9.3 17.5  25.6 25.6 45.1 33.8
North America  221.4  223.1 233.2 175.0 97.0 74.8  75.7 92.7 129.1 114.5
OECD
e  783.6 563.6 538.8 445.8 397.2 459.1 558.5 558.4 612.3 580.8
 
a. Figures are not fully comparable because not all countries count asylum seekers in the same way.  
b. The figures do not include people immigrating as refugees. 
c. EU-15, Norway, Switzerland. 
d. “New“ EU member states of 2004, candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania). 
e. Listed countries only. 
Source: OECD (2003), U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (2003).   66





























USA  283,230,000  34,988,000  12.4    1,534,800  1,064,318    3.7 
Canada    31,300,000    5,826,000  18.6       220,000     227,313    7.3 
Australia    19,358,000    4,705,000  24.3       224,000     102,049    5.3 
New Zealand      3,814,000       850,000  22.2         55,700       47,401  12.7 
 
a. Foreign students, seasonal workers, other persons with temporary status; estimates for Canada. 
b. Without foreign students, seasonal workers, other persons with temporary status. 
Source: U.N. Population Division (2002); International Organization for Migration (IOM; 2003); Papademetriou (2003); New Zealand Immigration Service 
(2003); Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC; 2001); Australian DIMIA (2000, 2001); U.S. Census Bureau (2000, 2001). 
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a. Without foreign students, seasonal workers, other persons with temporary status. 
b. Bilaterally for citizens of Australia in New Zealand and for citizens of New Zealand in Australia. 
Source: IOM (2003); Papademetriou (2003); CIC  (2001); Australian DIMIA (2000, 2001, 2002); U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS; 2002); New Zealand Immigration Service (2003). 
        US  Canada  Australia 
New 
Zealand 
       
Permanent Legal Immigr. 2001
a  1.064.318  250.346    119.525    47.314 
Among them:        
Family reunion     675.178    66.644  33.470    12.671 
Economic migrants     179.195  152.939  44.730    25.768 
Lottery       42.015  -           -              - 
Free movement
b                -  -  25.165      3.602 
Humanitarian immigration     124.507   27.894  13.740      4.026 
        Refugees       97.305    12.263    4.000         777 
        Asylum seekers       11.201    11.891    5.580         714 
        Other humanitarian       16.001     3.740    4.160      2.535 
Others       43.423     2.869    2.420         874   68













Education/Training 25  34  24 
Professional experience  21    6  20 
Age 10  17  20 
Family member already in the country    5    9    6 
Language skills English/French
b 24  14      0 
Job offer
c 10      4  16 
High priority occupation    0    9    0 
Prior work or studies in the country    5  11    8 
Other aspects    5    6    8 
Pass mark as % of possible points
d   75 63  59 
 
a. Relative weights may exceed 100 percent because some points are awarded on the basis of two criteria (for example, professional experience in combination with job offer).  
b. French in Canada only. 
c. Related to training or professional experience. 
d. 2003. 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2001); Australian DIMIA (2000, 2001, 2002); New Zealand Immigration Service 2003, Papademetriou (2003). 
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Table 15 Migrants Living in OECD Countries, Compared with Domestic Population, 
by Education Level) 
 
   Educational  Level 
Country Total  Primary  or  less  Secondary  Tertiary 
        
East Asia        
China, PR  0.1  0.1 0.1 1.9
Indonesia 0.1  0.1 0.2 2.0
Philippines  1.1  0.2 0.7 3.6
        
EECA       
Turkey  5.7  1.0 11.5 39.1
        
LAC        
Brazil  0.2  0.1 0.6 1.3
Jamaica 8.7  1.2 10.6 95.8
        
MENA       
Morocco  4.0  0.3 6.9 43.5
Tunisia 3.1  0.3 5.2 33.3
Egypt  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.5
        
South Asia        
Bangladesh  0.1  0.1 0.2 1.5
India 0.1  0.1 0.1 1.3
Pakistan  0.1  0.1 0.3 3.3
Sri Lanka  0.7  0.1 0.4 16.5
 
Note: Numbers are interpreted as follows: for Morocco, the number of Moroccans with tertiary 
education living in OECD countries equals 43.5 percent of the tertiary educated living in Morocco. 
Source: Adams (2003). 
 
 
 
 
 